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ARGUMENT
In an interlocutory ruling earlier in this litigation, this Court held: (1) that 12·
U.S.C. § 92a(a) is unambiguous regarding which state a national bank is "located"
in when the bai:iJ.c conducts a non-judicial foreclosure; (2) that the Comptroller of
the Currency's regulation interpreting §92a(a) is unreasonable; and (3) that under
Utah law, national banks do not compete with state title insurance companies.

Federal National Mortgage Association v. Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ,r,r 21-49. Bank
of America's opening and reply briefs in this appeal explain why those rulings are
erroneous. See Opening Br. 20-42; Reply Br. 2-20. The opening brief, however
(which was submitted to the Court of Appeals), acknowledged that the rulings
required the Court of Appeals to affirm the trial court's judgment. This Court, of
course, is not similarly bound; it could overrule Sundquist. See Opening Br. 20-21.
In light of this important difference, Bank of America submits this supplemental
brief.

I.

OVERRULING OF SUNDQUIST IS WARRANTED UNDER LAW-OF-THE-CASE
DOCTRJNE

As this Court has explained, "[t]he 'law of the case' is a legal doctrine under
which a decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in
successive stages of the same litigation." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P .2d
1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). The degree to which a decision is binding, however,
varies based on the posture of a case. More specifically, under the "branch of the

-I- .
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· doctrine[] often called the mandate rule," lower courts are rigidly bound by higher
courts' holdings in the same case. Id. By contrast, a request for a court to revisit
its own ruling in the same case "involves a branch of the ... doctrine which is more
flexible than the mandate rule." Id. at 1038. This second branch "is not a limit on
power but[] ... merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen
what has been decided." Id. at 1038-1039 (citing Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S.
436, 444 (1912), and Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618-619 & n.8 (1983)).

Iri other words, "[t]he second branch neither mandates blind adherence to earlier
rulings nor does it 'rise to the dignity of res judicata or stare decisis."' State v.
O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694,697 (Utah 1993) (quoting Richardson v. Grand Central
Corp., 572 P.2d 395,397 (Utah 1977)); accord, e.g., State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d

393, 399 (Utah 1994) (stare decisis "is neither mechanical nor rigid as it relates to
courts of last resort"). In particular, a court can reopen an issue "when the court is
convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest
injustice." Thurston, ·892 P .2d at 103 9. For all the reasons given in Bank of
America's opening and reply briefs,. that standard is met as to this Court~s
interlocutory decision in this case.
II.

OVERRULING OF SUNDQUIST Is

wARRANTED IRRESPECTIVE OF LAw-OF-

THE-CASE DOCTRINE

Even if this Court's prior decision had been made in another case, such that
the Court were considering that decision apart from law-of-the-case doctrine,
-243148952;1
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overturning the decision would be justified. In determining whether to overrule
precedent notwithstandip.g principles of stare decisis, the Court evaluates "(1) the
persuasiveness of the authority and reasoning on which the precedent was
originally based, and (2) how firmly the precedent has become established in the
law since it was handed down." Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ,I 22. The
second factor, in tum, involves examining "the age of the precedent, how well it
has worked in practice, its consistency with other legal principles, and the extent to
which people's reliance on the precedent would create injustice or hardship if it
were overturned." Id
Both factors counsel strongly in favor of overruling Sundquist. First, as
Bank of America's briefs in this appeal explicate, Sundquist's reasoning and
authorities are not persuasive. See Opening Br. 20-42; Reply Br. 2-20. And
second, Sundquist is not firmly established. To begin with, the decision issued just
four years ago-a small :fraction of the 32 years that this Court in Eldridge deemed
insufficient to firmly establish a precedent that was not "regularly used and relied
on." 2015 UT 21, ,I 34; see also id. ,I 37. That description certainly applies to

Sundquist: Not only has the decision been cited very few times, but also the only
two cases that ever relied on the holdings challenged here have both been reversed
or abrogated. Specifically, the trial court in Distressed Asset Solutions Fund I,

LLC v. Adamson, Case No. 140500067 (Utah Dist. Ct. Sept. 2, 2014), relied on
-343148952;1
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Sundquist in ruling that a foreclosure sale conducted by ReconTrust was void, see
id. at 18 (attached as Exhibit A). But on appeal this Court reversed. See Bank of
America v. Adamson, 201 7 UT 2, ,r,r 18-3 7. That reversal likewise abrogated the
trial court's decision in US. Bank National Association v. Ring, Case No.
140500502 (Utah Dist. Ct. Sept. 4, 2015), which "[r]el[ied] to a large degree upon
the rational[e] of [the trial court's determination] in Adamson," id. at 6 (attached as
Exhibit B).
This Court;, meanwhile, has cited Sundquist only twice: in Adamson, where
the Court merely held that the issue of whether to overrule Sundquist had not been
adequately briefed, see 201 7 UT 2 at ,r,r 9-13, and in another case (one involving
different issues) for the proposition (which long predates Sundquist) that "the
existence of ambiguity in a statute subject to implementation-by a federal agency
· requires judicial deference to the agency's resolution of the ambiguity," Hughes

. General Contractors, Inc. v. Utah Labor Commission, 2014 UT 3, ,r 24. Finally,
the few other courts that have cited Sundquist have all either disagreed with it or
deemed it distinguishable. See Dutcher v. Matheson, 840 F.3d 1183, 1200, 1201
(10th Cir. 2016) (disagreeing with Sundquist's Chevron step-one holding); Garrett

v. ReconTrust Co., NA., 546 F. App'x 736, 738 '(10th Cir. 2013) (same); see also
Parker for Chandlerv. Citimortgage, Inc., 2014 WL 12686741, at *1 (D. Utah
Mar. 4, 2014) (holding Sundquist inapplicable). Given that Eldridge deemed a

-443148952;1
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much older decision not "firmly established" under similar circumstances,

Sundquist assuredly is not.
In light of Sundquist' s youth and the lack of reliance on it, the remaining
considerations-how well Sundquist' s holding has worked in practice and whether
it has become inconsistent with other principles of law-are largely in.apposite.
That said; the decision would not work well in practice. Indeed, as the U.S.
Solicitor General explained in his amicus brief in this case, Sundquist' s
interpretation of§ 92a(a) would, "throw into confusion the comp le~ system of
modem interstate banking." U.S. Amicus Brief at 17, Federal National Mortgage

Association v. Sundquist, No. 13-852 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2014). Moreover, the decision
has undercut the established policy of the Comptroller to "simplify the
det~rmination of where a bank with multi-state operations is acting iri a fiduciary
capacity." Id. (quoting Fiduciary Activities ofNational Banks, 66 Fed. Reg.
34,792, 34,795 (July 2, 200 I)). That provides yet a further reason to discard it.
In short, even if the question were one of stare decisis rather than the more
flexible law-of-the-case doctrine, overruling Sundquist would be warranted.

-543148952;1
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CONCLUSION
Sundquist should be overruled and the district court's judgment should be
reversed.
Dated: October 16, 2017

Brian E. Pumphrey
(admitted pro hac vice)
MCGUIREWOODS LLP
Gateway Plaza
800 East Canal Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219-3916
(804) 775-7745

Respectfully submitted,

I
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ROBERT H. SCOTT
AKERMANLLP
170 South Main Street, Suite 950
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 907-6910

DANIELS. VOLCHOK
(admitted pro hac vice) ·
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTO~ COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DISTRESSED ASSEl' SOLUTIONS FUND

I, LLC, ·

DECISION AND ORDERDISMISSING
ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Plaintiff,

vs.
· CaseNo. 140500067
SAMUEL D. ADAMSON; COURTNEY D.
ADAMSON; et al.,.

Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox

Defendants.

This is 8:Il action for unlawful detainer, which came on for trjal on August 7, 2014, after

which the court took the matter wider advisement. The court now dismisses this action for the
reasons given below.

Pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-6-802.5,
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty~of unlawful
detainer if the person:
(1) defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in disposition of the property by a
· trustee's sale or sheriffs sale; and
.
_... (2) &ontinues to occupy the property after ~e trustee's sale or sheriffs sale after
being served with a notice to qll:it by the purchaser.
At trial, Plaintiff presented as exhibits certified copies of the notice of default, the trust

000-402
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deed, and its own quitclaim deed, thus making out a prima facie case uncle; the statute. l

In defense, however, Def~ndants raised~~ issue of whether subdivision (I)7s
requireme~t of"disposition of the property by a trustee's sale" has been satis:fied.2 ·There appe~s

to be no question that Defendants defaulted on their obligations under a note se.cured by a trust
deed, and that ReconTrust, acting as trustee, gave notice of default and intention to sell the
property, and ultimately conducted a.trustee's sale in Januruy 2010, purporting to sell th~
property to Plaintiff's predecessor in interest.

· Defendants argue that because the 2010 trustee's sale was conducted by ReconT:tJlS~ who
was nor a qualified 1I1lstee with the power of sale under Utah Code sections 57-1-21 and 57-1-23,

~Fed.Nat. Mortgage Ass'n v. Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ~ 13, 311 P.3d 1004 (''ReconTrustis

neither a member of the Utah State Bar nor a title insurance company or agency with an office in
the State of Utah. ReconTrust.was therefore not ·a qualified trustee with the power of sal~ under
Utah Code sections 57-1-21 and 57-1-23."); .m:., ~ 49 ("As a national bank operating in Utah

1

Plaintiff also agreed to file, after trial, a certified copy of the 2007 trust deed, but thus
far has not done so.
2

In addressing this defense, the court considers, in addition to the evidence and
arguillents presented at trial, the briefing submitted on Defendants' Motion for Declaratory
Judgment. At trial, the court· indicated that it would not grant such motion at that time because
there was nothing in Defendants' pleadings suggesting that they were seeking declaratory relief.
However, also as indicated at trial, the m_otion addresses the substance of Defendants~ defense, so
the court references such briefing as a matter of convenience. Plaintiff's opposition memorandum
filed May 23, 2014, is referenced herein as "Mem. Opp."
2

0(10403 ..
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under the [National Banking Act], ReconTrust is precluded from exercising the power of a
trustee under Utah statute for purposes of conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure.,,), the sale and
resulting trust deed are null and void ab initio.
As Plaintiff correctly notes, the Sundquist court expressly declined to decide what effect,
if any, its detennination that ReconTrust did not qualify as a trustee with the power of sale would
have on the validity of the sale-and resulting trust deed. See gL., ,r 50 ("Our opinion-in this matter

is limited to the narrow issue of whether Utah law regarding the qualification of trustees is
preempted by the [National Banking Act]. In briefing and oral argument, the parties have
attempted to raise a variety of other issues relating to the validity of the nonjudicial foreclosure
sale, the validity of _the trustee's deed, and the propriety of the order of restitution. Because these
issues were not fully litigated below, we decline to reach them on interlocutory appeal.))).
However, as Plaintiff also points out, the Court of Appeals has been presented with
argwnents similar to those of Defendants, and has not even considered it necessary to reach the~
where ~e party attacking the validity of a trustee's sale failed to allege or prove how its rights
were affected by the defect complained of. For example, in RM Lifestyles. LLC
.

v. Ellison, 2011

.

UT App 290, 263 P .3 d 1152, the defendants in an unlawful detainer action "argued that the trust
deed

~ale was void because [the trustee] recorded the notice of default before it had been

substituted as trustee, that the statute did not allow [the beneficiazy] to ratify [the trustee,s]

action, and that the execution of the substitution of trustee violated the statute of frauds." Mu~
3

000404
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15.· On review, the Court of Appeals declined to "reach the merits of these issues because the·
[defendants], in attacking the trust deed sale's validity after the sale, ha[d] not met their burden
of proving that the alleged irregularity affected their rights/ id. (footnote omitted), and "[did] not
claim tha~ they were denied the right to cure the default or ever planned on or were capable of
curing the default.,, Id., 118 (citation omitted).

Similarly, in Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT App 206,285 P.3d 7, the plaintiff argue_d
"that the trustee's sale [was] void" because the individual who "recorded the notice of default and
held the trustee's sale" did so ''before [the beneficiary] executed and recorded a written
substitution of1rustee." ML 1 13. The plaintiffalso, challenged the beneficiary's later "attempt"to
ratify [this individual's] actions after the trustee sale." Id. In other words, like Defell:dants here,
the·plaintiff attacked the validity of the sale based on the questionable authority of the one who
conducted it Again, the Court of Appeals declined fo decide these issues on their merits based on
the fact tllat, "in attacking the validity of the trustee's sale, (the plaintiff] ha[d] not alleged that
the challenged substitution of trustee impacted her rights." Id.

In contrast to RM Lifestyles and Reynolds are two cases cited by Defendants. First, in an

early Utah Supreme Court case, the court ~eld a trust s~e void where it was not performed ~y the
person authorized under the deed of trust:
The deed of trust authorized the sale to be made by the United States Marshal.
This was rt8f ciorie. One of his deputies made the sale as auctioneer. It is not
claimed that he acted as deputy, but simply that a person who was a deputy acted
4

000ft05
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the auctioneer. Nor do we think that the marshal could have acted by deputy,
unless the deed of trust had shown express authority to that effect, which it did not
. do. The fact that no injmy or fraud in the sale has been shown, does not affect the
question. Nor is it affected by the fact that the purchaser was an innocent part;y.
The sale was made by one not authorized to make it. and cannot be upheld. It is
simply void, and no one ·gains any rights under it. A purchaser must know that the
sale is made by the proper person. The deed of trust shows who could make the
no doubt employ .an auctioneer to act for him in crying off the
sale. A trustee
property; but the trustee must be present 8J_ld superintend the sale. The trustee in
the present instance says that he doe'S not think he was present at the sale.
f!S

can

Singer Mfg. Co. v. Chalmers. 2 Utah 542, 546-47 (Utah Terr. 1880) (emphasis added).
More recently, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court ruling that a nonjudicial
foreclosure s~e for delinquent assessments owed to ~ condominium association was void where
the sale was conducted by the association's attorney because "[t]he record reveal[ed] that, though
its attorney may have qualified as a trustee under the Trust Deed Act, the Association failed to
appoint its attorney ·as such." McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass'n, inc., 2013
UT App 53, 1~ 19-21 & 28,298 P.3d 666.
Notably, the McQueen cqurt doe~ not dis~uss the obstacles to setting as~de a trustee sale
that were mentioned. and indeed clispositive, in the RM Lifestyles and Reynolds case_s, as
summarized above. Rather, the court simply addressed the claimed defect - the absence of the
statutorily required qualified appointed trustee - on its merits, and agreed that it ren~ered the sale

void. Reconciliation of these cases is difficult.
Reconciliation of Singer with RM Lifestyles and Reynolds is also difficult. To say, as do

5
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these later cases, that a party attacking the validity ofa ·trustee sale must allege that the claimed
defect result~d in an injury to "the interests of the debtor," or "some attendant fraud or unfair
dealing," RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App 290, ~ 16, or a circumstance "reach(ing] unjust
extremes," id.; Reynolds, 2012 UT App 206, ~ 15, is plainly at odds with Singer's stat~ment tha~
where an unauthorized person conducts the sale, "[t]he fact that no injury or fraud in the sale has
been shown, does not affect the question.» 2 Utah at 547.
·Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Singer on the ground that the deed of trust in that case
I

specified who could conduct the sale., and that there is no such provision in the trust deed here.
Plaintiff also notes that Singer was decided well before the current governing statutes, and
criticizes Defendants for not providing any additional authority to support their argument that the
sale here is void.

Plaintiff's arguments are unpersuasive. First, the provisions in Utah Code sections 57-121 and 57-1-23 restricting who is authorized to conduct a trustee's sale are clearly comparable to
the trust deed provision identifying who was authorized to conduct the sale in Singer, particularly
.

.

since "a contract,U such as the trust deed here, "implicitly contains the laws existing_ at the time it
was entered."3 Washington Nat. Ins. Co. y, Shenvood Associates, 795 P.2d 665,669 (Utah Ct

3

It is unnecessary to decide which law to apply here (i.e., the law in effect in August

2007, when the tru~t deed was executed, or the law in effect in January 2010, when the trust sale

occurred) since the statutory provisions defining a qualified trustee did not change between these
periods.
6
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A-6

r

r

App. 1990) (citing, among other cas~s, Beehive Med. Elecs., Inc. v. Ind~s. Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53,,
6Q (Utah 1978) (citing Edwards v. Kearze¼ 96 U.S. 595,601, 24 L.Ed. 793 (1878) (holding that

contracts embrace laws which affect their validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement)));
59 C.J.S. Mortgages§ 739 (WestlawNext database updated June 2014) ("The power to sell under

deed of trust is [a] matter of contract between [the] mortgagor and mortgagee under the tenns

and conditions expressed in [the] deed of trust instrument. It cannot be enlarged beyond the terms
of the contract and the incor:porated relevant statutes.") (emphasis added and footnotes.omitted).
Thus, this attempted distinction fails.

Second, while Singer is an older case, it is consistent with prevailing law on the subject .
today, as well

as with clll:ent Utah statutory law. As·a leading treatise on real estate financing

explains:
Generally, defects in the exercise of a power of sale can be categorized in at least
three ways - void, voidable, or inconsequential.
Some defects are so substantial that they render the sale void. In this situation,
-neither legal nor equitable title transfers to the sale purchaser or subsequent
grantees, except perhaps by adverse possession .. , . A sale ... is void when
someone other than the named trustee conducts the sale, including a successor
who has not been validly appoin(ed, or, conv~rsely, if the original trustee condupts ·
the sale after a successor-trustee has been appointed.

Most defects render the foreclosure voidab/e·and not void. When a voidaJ,le error
occurs, bare legal title passes to the sale purchaser, subject to the redemption
rights of those injured by the defective foreclosure. Typically, a voidable error is
"an irregularity in the execution of a foreclosure sale" and must be "substantial or
result in a probable unfairness." ... If the defect only renders the sale voidable,
7
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,,,•,:·

the redemption rights can be cut off if a bona: fide purchaser for value acquires the
land. When this occurs, an action for damages against the foreclosing mortgagee
or trustee may be the only remaining remedy.
Finally, some defects are so inconsequential that they render the sale neither ~oid
nor voidable. These defects commonly involve minor discrepancies in the notice
of sale....

Grant S. Nelson, Dale A. Whitm,an et al, Real Estate Finance Law§ 7:21 ·at 953-957 (6th ed.
2014) (hereinafter Nelson & Whitman) (underscoring added and footnotes omitted; italics in
original).
Viewed within this framework, Singer clearly talces its place in the first category, and the
prerequisites to setting aside a sale identified in RM Lifestyles and Reynolds are seen to be
applicable only to those defects properly categorized as rendering a sale voidable rather than
void. 1bis is consistent with Singer, which expressly disavows any su?h prerequisites as to a sale
conducted by one not authorized to do so. It is also consistent with McQueen, ythich affinned
. that a sale was void based only

on the fact that the person who conducted it had not been

appointed as a trustee as statutorily required.
- The limited applicability of the prerequisites stated in RM Lifestyles and Reynolds is also

shown by examination of the cases cited therein. For instance, bot4 cases quote the statement
made in Concepts. Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Servs .• Inc., 743 P.2d 1158., 1160 (Utah 1987) (per
curiam), that "[a] sale once made will not be set aside unless the interests of the debtor were

sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing.'' 2011 UT App 290., ~ 16; 2012

8
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UT App 206, ,r 14. Concepts involved the attempted invalidation of a sale based on the fact that

the notice of sale, which was printed in 19~3, incorrectly stated that the sale wasto be conducted
on a given date in 1982, see _743 P .2d at_ 1159 - a defect that the court ultimately characterized as
a "minor typographical error." Id. at 1161. Thus, the statement quoted is clearly taken from a case
falling into the third category described above (one involving "minor discrep:ancies in the noti~e
of sale"), not one involving what Singer held to be a fundamental error. 4
Similarly, RM Lifestyles and Reynolds each state that a trustee's sale should be set aside

"only in cases which reach unjust extremes." 2011 UT App 290, ,r 16; 2012 UT App 206; ,r 15.
Forthls proposition, RM Lifestyles cites Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), which in tum cited·concepts, see kb and wltlch involved only a challenge to the manner

, in which the sale w~ conducted - namely, the trustee's acceptanc~ of a bid offering to pay ''fair
marlcet value" (rather than a specific dollar amount) for the property. The court rejected this .
challenge, holding that the statute yvas satisfied by th~ bid and "fmd[ing] no evidence that [the

4

Significantly, Concepts actually reiterates the underlying principle from Singer
(although with a different focus in mind-namely, the party intended to benefit from statutory
notice requirements), that "[t]he maker of the deed of trust with power of sale may condition the
exercis.e of the power upon such conditions as he may describe_,, 743 P.2d at 1160 (citing
Houston First American Savings v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. 1983)) (emphasis
omitted). The cited case elaborates, as noted in Concepts, saying that "[t]he grantor of the power
[of sale] is entitled to have his directions obeyed; to have the proper notice of sale given; to have

it to take place at the.time and place, and by the person appointed by him." 650 S.W.2d at 768
(emphasis added and ci~tion omitted).

9
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debtor's] interests were sacri:ficed·by the trustee's action .... "Id.at 189.5 RM Lifestyies and
Reynolds also cite Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ~~ 36-37, 86 P.3d 699, which ~gain merely
· reiterated the holding of Concepts, and which, like Concepts, involved - as pertinent ~ere - only
a challenge to the sufficiency of the notice of the sale given to the debtor. Id.
Thus, none of the cases cited to support the prerequisites identified in RM Lifestyles and
Reynolds involved "a purported sale by an unauthorized person,,, which is to be distinguished
from cases-in which there is merely "a question ofprocequral irregularities in a trustee's sale."
Citizens Bank of Edina v, W. Quincy Auto Auction, Inc., 7.42 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo, 1987) (en
bane). Where, as here (and as m Singer), there is "a completely unauthorized sale conducted by
an individual who was powerless to" sell the property," it is irrelevant "[w]hether.in point of fact,
the sale of the property was conducted in all respects judiciously or not) or in a manner most
conducive to the interests of those concerned,,, although "[t]his would be a legitimate inquiry in a
proceeding to set aside a sale ~ade under the power conferred by the instrument. .... ,, Id.

(citation omitted). Thi~ conclusion is inconsistent with Reynolds, but that case must yield to
Singer based on the principle that "[t]he Court of Appeals simply cannot overrule the law as

5

Thomas also included a footnote summarily rejecting the debtor's additional challenge
in that case to the trustef s acceptance of a credit bid rather than "requir[ing] the bid to be
'pay~ble in lawful money of the United State~ at the time of sale,' as allegedly _instructed in the
trust deed"-a provision that, ifit existed, the court held to be satisfied by the credit bid. See 801
P.2d at 188 n.1.
·
10
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announce~ by the highest court in the state, even if the announcement was I_Tiade decades ago."
Sentzy Investigations, Inc. v. Davis, 841 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Plaintiff also relies on the holding in Reynolds that, "[a]bsent such exceptional
circumstances [i.e., harm to the interests of the debtor, fraud, unfair dealing, or unjust extremes],
the proper remedy is to seek an injunction prior to a sale, which allows a debtor to challenge
irregularities and protect her rights before the sale is completed and a trustee's deed is exe~uted
and delivered to the purchaser." 2012 UT App 206, ~ 15 (citing RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App

290,, 15 n.4 (internal citation omitted)) (emphasi~ added). Because, as just discussed,
Reynolds's require~ent ofhann, etc. as a prerequisite to setting aside a trustee's sale must be

limited (under Singer) to those cases involving defects rend_ering a ~ale voidable rather than void,
the companion requirement that challenges to irregularities be raised via a pre-sale injunction
proceeding, except where hann, etc., is shown, must likewise be so limited .. To hold otherwise.
would be to say_ that a debtor need not attempt to obtain a pre-sale injunction in a case in ~hich
the sale is only voidable (because it may be set aside thereafter by a showing of harm, etc.), but
that such an attempt must be made where the sale is utterly void. .

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that ~'the cloctrines of waiver and estoppel bar Defendants'
claim that the Foreclosure Sale is void and should be set aside." ~e~. Opp. at 9. To support this
argument, Plaintiff observes that
Defendants did not challenge the Foreclosure Sale before it occurred. It is
11
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undisputed that the Foreclpsure Sale took place in Januazy 2010. It is also
undisputed that although the Defendants in this case filed a class-action suit in
federal court in November 2010, they have not prosecuted their claims in the
Federal Action since the ruling in Garrett in September 20.13, which ruled that a
foreclosure sale done in Utah by ReconTrust was valid. It is undisputed that
Defendants filed a Motion to Set Aside the Foreclosure Sale in the Prior State
Case in July 2010, but failed to prosecute this claim, and allow~d the case to be
dismissed on June 21, 2012. Importantly, although the Defendants in this case
were, or ~e, parties in the Prior'State Action and Federal Action respectively, they
failed to ever record a lis pendens on the Property. It is also undisputed that
.
Defendants have failed to pay any value; and have failed to pay property taxes, for
the Property since June 2009. Like the mortgagor in American Falls Canal
Securities Co., the Defendants in this case have failed to properly and timely
assert their rights to defeat the rights of Plaintiff: an innocent bona fide purchaser.
Defendants have lmowingly and silently sat qn any alleged rights they have to the
Property, and most importantly, have allowed Plaintiff to expend money
purchasing the Property. Defendants do not claim they had the ability to cure the
default and stop the Foreclosure Sal~. Defendants did- not challenge the sale before
it occurred, and therefore, the Trustee's Deed from ReconTrust must remain
valid. [FN] 1

[FN] 1 Even'ifthe court"considered a trustee's deed voidable, "[a] voidable deed ..
. 'is unassailable in the hands a [bona fide purchaser]."' See SEC v. Madison
Real Estate Group, LLC, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279 (D. :mah 2009) (citation
omitted).
·

of

Mero. Opp. at 9" 10.

In the American Falls case cited, the Supreme Court recognized that "a party otherwise in
position to object to a mortgage foreclosure sale may well be precluded fr~m ~oing so based
upon conduct sufficient to bring into operation· Qie doctrines of waiver and estoppel.,, Am. Falls
.

.

Canal Sec. Co. v. Am. Sav. & LoanAss'n, 775 P.2d 412, ~14 (Utah 1989) (footnotes omitted).
The court indicated; however, that a party may not w~~YI? the ri~t ~o challenge, or be estopped
12
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from ch~lenging, a sale ,yh~lly_ void, see'id. ("[E]xcept where no~-compliance results in a·
complete legal nullity, one otherwise entitled to object to a judicial sale in mortgage foreclosure
proceedings as involving a defect or irregularity ·based upon a lack of or insufficient process,
notice, advertisement or other designation with respect to the sale, designed for his benefit and
protection, may waive, or be estopped from asserting, such defect

or irregularity;") (emphasis

added and citation omitted); ~ also Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ~ 22, 189 P .3d 51, 57
(d~stinguishing "' ... between an illegal or void contract and one merely ultra vires,' which could
become enforceable by ratification or estoppel'') (quoting Millard Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State Bank
ofMillard Cnty., 80 Utah 170, 14 P.2d 967, 971-72 (1932)), which, under Singer, is whatresults
from a trustee's sale conducted by one not having authority. 6

.

Moreover, eyen where it has been said that "[a] want of authority in the trustee making
the sale may be waived by the parties in interest, or they may estop themselves by their conduct
to object to such want of authority, at least as against the purchaser at the sale/' ;59 C.J.S.
Mortg~ges § 764 (WestlawNext databas~ update~ June2014) (citing Reynolds v. Kroff, 144 Mo.
433, 46 S.W. 424 (1898); Spencer v. Hawkins, 39 N.C. 288, 4 Ired. Eq. 288, 1846 WL 1113

6 Plaintiff relies

on Ockey, which held that a conveyance effected by trustees after the
termination of the trust "was merely voidable" rather than void, see 2008 UT 37, t 24, and on
Millard County, which held that securities issued by a bank in excess of its statutory authority

were likewise only voidable,~ id., f 22, but these cases did not involve a trustee's foreclosure
sale, in which context the clear rule is shown by Singer and the other authorities discussed above.

13
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(1846); Schwarz v. Kellogg. 243 S.W. 179 (Mo. 1922)), the conduct giving rise to the waiver or

~Stoppel in the cited· c~es was considerably more affumative than anything Defendants are
·alleged to have done here.
Certainly, Defendants' failure to pay truces or any other value for the property since June

2009,7- while remaining in possession, is unders{andably frustrating for the foreclosure sale
purchaser (or its successor in interest), but it is not inconsistent with their claim that the sale is
void, 8 nor can their failure to affirmatively pursue judicial vindication of their position during
this period properly be so characterized. 9 Cf Hammon v. Hatfield, 192 Minn. 259,261,256
7 At trial,

Mr. Adamson actually acknowledged not having ma_de payments since
December 2008, explaining that, since April 2010, their lender refused to accept any payments.
8

Indeed, under the circumstances, it would be the making of payments to the purchaser at

the sale, or to its successor in interest, that would be would be inconsistent with Defendants'

claim.
9

Defendants' federal class-action lawsuit (initiated in November 2010), was -stayed
pending the outcome of Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 546 F. App'x 736 (10th Cir. 2013)
(which, contrary to Plaintiffs suggestion, did not.unqualifiedly hold "that ReconTrust had the
authority to act as a trustee in Utah, and therefore, the foreclosure saie that took place in the
Garrett case was valid," Mem. Opp. at 3), and appears to remain pending. Resolution of the
"Prior State Case'' (case number 100501437 in this court) is difficult to follow. This Wf\S an
unlawful detainer action file(;l"against Defendants by Plaintiff's predecessor in interest, and
appears to have been dismissed due to the failure of both sides to appear at a hearjng on or about
June 19, 2012: (The Order of Dismissal is a minute entry for a hearing that appears to have been
held on June 19, 2012 (the date of the caption), but the signature line on the order is dated June
·20, 2012, which is also the file stamp date, and the order was filed in CORIS on June 21, 2012.)
However1 the parties in the case ha'=1 previously stipulated to continue the scheduled trial
"without date,,, an order to that effect was entered on November 17, 2011, and no prior notice of
any hearing scheduled thereafter appears in CORIS.
14
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N.W. 94, 95 (1934) (property occupants claiming under mortgagor one year after void
foreclosure sale were "rightfully in possession" and could not be barred from challenging the
validity of such sale py statute requiring any challenge to be brought "with reasonable diligence,"
the principle being that ''one who is himself in the legal enjoyment of his property cannot have
his rights therein forfeited to ano~er, for failure to bring suit against that other within a time
\

specified to test the validity of a claim which the latter asserts, but takes no steps to enforce, It
has consequently been held that a statute which, after a lapse of five years, makes a reoorded

deed purporting to be executed under a statutory power conclusive evidence of a goo·d title, could
not be valid as a limitatjon law •against the original owner in possession of the land. Limitation

.

.

laws cannot compel a resort to legal proceedings by one who is already in the complete
enjoyment of all he claims,") (citation and internal quotation marks _omitted). The same is true of
Defendants' failure to file a lis pendens) as they have explained, since a void sale transfers no
title under Singer, and there ·was no need to bring their challenge prior to· the sale, as discussed
above.

Plaintiff argues that some of the same conduct just discussed also ~onstituted a
.

.

ratification of the foreclosure sale) but the court disagrees for the s~e reasons such conduct is
not an estoppel or waiver, not least ofw~ch is tlr~ fact that, as Plaintiff itself recognizes) "[al
~ontract or a deed that is void c~ot be ratified or accepted .... " Ockey. 2008 UT 37) 1f 18
(footnote omitted).
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Plaintiff also argues that the statutory remedy s~t forth in Utah Code section 57M 1-23.5 is
· exclusive, but this section was not added until 2011, the year after the sale at issue here, and
. Plaintiff has made no argument to show its retroactive applicability.
Finally, Plaintiff stresses that it is a bona fide purchaser for value. Assuming that to be
true, 10 hmyeyer, -Singer clearly holds that such status cannot validate a void sale. This

determinatidn is not altered by Utah Code section 57-1-:28 1s provision stating that trust deed
"recitals of compliance with the requirements of Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to the
exercise of the power of sale and sale _of the property described in the trustee's deed,, "are

conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without
notice.'.' Utah Co~e Ann. § 57-1-28(2)(c)(ii).
For obvious reasons, such provisions cannot be taken completely at face value. See
Nelson & Vvhitman § 7.22 at 982 (describing "[t]he literal language of this ... type of statute" as
"breathtakingly broad in its impact on BFPs,, as it "arguably applies even when the mortgagee
had no substantive right to foreclose,,, such as where "a lender forecloses though the secured

obligation is no~ in default or if the mortgage is forged" - a resul~ that ~ould be '.'fundamentally
unfair and is probably legislatively unintended"). In an earlier treatment of the subject, Nelson

10

Such an assumption may be unduly generous, given that Defendants have remained in
possession of the property challenging the validity of the saie at all times since the sale, thereby
giving notice to Plaintiff, prior to Plaintiff's purchase, of the claimed defect in the exercise of the
power of sale.
.

16
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and Whitman went as far as to assert that 'lthe conclusive impact" of such statutes should be
..

limited ''to procedural defects in the foreclosure proces~,, consistent with the likely legislative
intent. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Refonning Foreclosur~:. The Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 Duke L.J. 1399, 1506-1507 (2004).
Although this suggested bright-line limitation did not find its way into the most recent

version of Nels on and Whitman> s treatise, it appears to accurately reflect how these "conclusive»
statutory pre~umptions should be understood. See Main I Ltd. P'ship v. Ventur.e Capital Const. &
Dev. Com., 154 Ariz. 256,. 260, 741 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (observing, wi~ ·
reference to an Arizona conclusive presumption statute similar to that of Utah, and without
.

.

apparent disagreement, that "[w]hen the California cases hold that recitals in a deed of 1Iust are
conclusive, they qualify that they ·are conclusive 'in· the absence of grounds for equitable relief, m
but finding equitable relief inappropriate in a case where there was no '·'fraud, misrepresentation,
.

.

... concealment," bad faith, or breach offiduc~ary duty) (emphasi~ added and citation omitted)~
Among the traditional grounds for equitable reli'ef not specifi~ally mentioned in Main I isl as
previously indicated, the absence of a power of sale in the party conducting such sal~. See 5
Tiffany Real Prop.§ 1550 (3d ed.) (WestlawNext database updated September 2013) ("It appears
that the sale will ordinarily be set aside in equity on grounds on which it would have been
previously enjoined, as for instance where the debt never existed, or has been extinguished, or
was conducted by a party without authority to do so, or where the notice _of sale was ~ubstantially

17
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defective.,,) (emp~asis added and footnotes omitted). Thus, the court conclud~s that the
,·protection afforded to BFPs by Utah Code section 57-1-28 is not intended to extend, and does
not extend, to protect aga~nst defects traditionally viewed as fundamental, such as the one at issue
here.
For these reasons, the court holds that Plaintlffhas nqt overcome Defendants' defense
that there has been no ''disposition of the property by a trustee's sale," as required under Utah
Code section 78B-.6..802.5, and accordingly dismisses this unlawful detainer action.
ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, AD!(IDGEf?, and DECREEP tliat:
I. Plaintiffs' unlawful detainer action is dismissed.
Dated this Q.t\JJ..·day of September:> 2014.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDIW-££1)1Slf1'ff~:

28

IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF.UTAHQ)~

FILED By _ _
_w:__,_._.______

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
AS TRUSTEE FOR GSR 2006-lF, its

successors and/or assigns,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff(s),
vs.

Case No. 140500502

JIM RING, and/or JOHN DOES 1-10,
JANE DOES 1-10,

Judge Kara Pettit

Defendant(s),
vs.

RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A. as a
Subsidiary of Bank of America, its
Successors and Assigns,
Third Party Defendant(s).

INTRODUCTION
The following four motions are before the Court, have been fully briefed, and the parties
appeared and presented oral argument on them on July 9, 2015:
1) Plaintiff U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for GSR 2006-IF's ("U.S. Bank")

Motion for Summary Judgment as to its unlawful detainer claim and Ring's
counterclaim, filed October 10, 2014;
2) Defendant Ring's Motion for Summary Judgment as to U.S. Bank's unlawful detainer

claim, filed Match 12, 2015;

1
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3) Plaintiff U.S. Bank's Motion to Dismiss Ring's Second Amended Counterclaim, filed
March 20, 2015;
4) ·Third-Party Defendant ReconTrust Company's ("ReconTrust") Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, filed May 4, 2015.

~- All four motions share one common issue that is a threshold detennirtation for the Court:
wh~ther the sale by the substitute trustee, ReconTrust, is void as ~ mat:ter of law because, at the
time of the sale, ReconTrust was not a qualified trustee with the power of sale pursuant to Utah
Code§§ 57-1-21 and 57-1-23.
The Court holds that the sale is void because ReconTrust never possessed the power of sale.
The Court addresses below the other issues presented by the motions as well.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Three similar standards of review are applicable to the pending motions. First, with
r~spect to U.S. Bank's and Ring's summary judgment motions, summary judgment is

appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
eQ.titled to ju~grnent as a matter oflaw. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court must construe all facts
and the reasonable inferences to be made therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving

party. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright &. Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258,
1261 (Utah 1984). Similarly, for U.S. Bank's Motion to Dismiss, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
"admits the facts alleged in the [pleading] but challenges the [party's] ri~ht to relief based ·on
those facts." State v. ApotexCorp., 2012 UT 36, 142, 282 P.3d 66. In the Rule 12(b)(6) co~text,
a court "assume[s] that the fa(?tual allegations in the [pleading) are true and ... draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [non-moving party]." Berneau v.

Martino, 2009 UT 87, 13, 223 P.3d 1128. "A motion to dismiss is properly granted ... in cases
2
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in which, even if the factual assertions in the [pleading] were correct, they provided no legal
basis for recovery." Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT App 36,113, 996 P.2d 1081.
Third-Party Defendant ReconTrust has moved for judgment on the pleadings on Ring's
Third-Party Complaint. "A court may enter judgment on the pleadings when the moving party is
entitled to judgment on the face of the pleadings themselves." Mountain Am. Credit Union v.

McClellan, 854 P.2d 590,591 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). A judgment on the pleadings is to be
affirmed "only if, as a matter of law, the nonmoving party...could not prevail under the facts
alleged." Id. at 591.

UNDISPUTED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1.

On November 30, 2005, Defendant Jim Ring purchased the property at 1102 Park

Avenue Park City, UT 84060. The lot is described as Lot 1, Pinnell Replat Subdivision in
Summit County Utah and all improvements located thereon (''the Property"). Joint Memo. in
Opposition to Defendant Ring's Motion for Stun111ary Judgment, Response to Ring's Statement

of Facts ("Response to Ring Facts"), ,rt.

2.

When Ring purchased the subject property, he executed a Trust Deed as Trustor, which

was delivered to the Trustee, Stewart T. Matheson, an active member of the Utah State Bar, for ·

the benefit of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), as beneficiary. On
November 30, 2005, the Trust Deed was recorded as Entry No. 00760223 in Book 01755 at Page
0030 in the Summit County Recorder's Office. Id, 12.
3.

The Trust Deed provides that the lender may appoint a successor trustee, who "shall

succeed to all the title, power and duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by Applicable Law."
Trust Deed, 124 (Ex. A to Ring's Memo. in support of Summary Judgment).

3
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4.

On September 26, 2008, MERS executed a Substitution of Trustee appointing

ReconTrust as trustee under the Deed of Trust. This document was recorded on September 30.,
2008 as Entry No. 00855927 in the Summit County Recorder's Office. Response to Ring Facts,

5.

ReconTrust published a Notice of Trustee's Sale in the Park Record newspaper on

Wednesday, December 31, 2008, January 7, 2009, and January 14, 2009 stating that ReconTrust
would be conducting a trustee's sale on the subject property on January 27, 2009. Id., 1J4.

6.

The sale did not proceed as noticed on January 27, 2009, but was postponed.until

February 26, 2009. U.S. Bank/ReconTrust's Statement of Additional Facts, ,r 7.

7.

On or about March 3, 2009, ReconTrust Company executed a Trustee's Deed which

recites that ReconTrust conducted a trustee's sale on the subject property and sold the subject
property to the Plaintiff, U.S. Bank, on February 26, 2009. Id, ,rs.

8.

ReconTrust was neither an active member of the Utah State Bar nor a Utah title insurance

company at the time of the foreclosure sale. Id, 11,
9.

On September 11, 2014, U.S. Banlc served Ring with a 5-Day Notice to

Vacate. Ring did not vacate, and continues to reside at the property located at 1102 Park Avenue
Park City, UT 84060. See Second Am. Countercl. 13,
10.

On September 18, 2014, U.S. Bank filed an unlawful detainer action against Ring. See

Original Compl. 1
11.

Ring filed an answer and counterclaim that the Court dismissed without prejudice.

1

U.S. Bank filed, but voluntarily dismissed, two prior unlawful detainer actions against Mr. Ring. See Silver
Summit Cases 090500313 and I 105000651. Mr. Ring's counterclaims in those prior actions were also dismissed
without prejudice.
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12.

Ring filed an amended counterclaim. On February 18, 2015, the Court granted Ring

leave to file a second amended counterclaim to address issues related to ReconTrust as trustee,
including adding ReconTrust as a Third-Party Defendant.
On February 27, 2015, Ring filed a second amended an~wer and counterclaim, including

13.

a claim against ReconTrust as a Third Party Defendant. See Second Am. Countercl.

ANALYSIS

I.

This Court Is Bound by the Utah Supreme Court's Holding in Federal Nat'/
Mortgage Ass 'n v. Sundquist that Section 92a of the National Banking Act (''NBA"}
Does Not Preempt Utah Code§§ 57-1-21 and 57-1-23.

In their opposition to Ring's summary judgment motion, U.S. Bank and ReconTrust
argue that ReconTrust's power of sale resulted from federal law that preempts state law. See
U.S. Bank/ReconTrust Opp. to Ring MSJ at 2. While U.S. Bank and ReconTrust acknowledge
that Utah Code§§ 57-1-23 and 57-1-21 limit the power of sale to active members of the Utah
State Bar and title insurance companies--and they admit ReconTrust was neither at the time of
sale-they argue that 12 U.S.C. § 92a and its implementing regulation, preempt Utah law.

As U.S. Bank/RecortTrust further acknowledge, however, this Court is bound by the Utah
Supreme Court's holding in Federal Nat 'l Mortgage Ass 'n v. Sundquist, which addressed this
precise question of preemption (and also involved ReconTrust), holding:
As anational bank operating in Utah under the NBA, ReconTrust is precluded from
.exercising the pow~r of a trustee under Utah statute for purposes Qf conducting a
nonjudicial foreclosure. Itwould be irrational to interpret§ 92a(b) or§ 9.7 as giving a
national bank such as ReconTrust authority to exercise a power that Utah law specifically
prohibits even Utah banks from exercising. We therefore hold that sections 57-1-21 and
57-1-23 of the Utah Code are not preempted by the NBA. A national bank seeking to
foreclose on real property in Utah must comply with Utah law.

Federal Nat'/ Mortgage Ass'n v. Sundquist, 2013 UT 45,149,311 P.3d 1004.
Therefore, the Court swhmarily rejects U.S. Bank/ReconTrust's preemption argument.

5
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II.

The Purp~rted Sale to U.S. Bank is Void Because ReconTrust Did Not Possess the
Power of Sale.
Relying to a large degree upon the rationale of a decislon.rendered in the Fifth District

Court by Judge Wilcox in Distressed Asset Solutions Fund v. Adamson, 2 Ring asserts U.S.
Bank's unlawful detainer claim fails as a matter of law because the sale to U.S. Bank is void.
This Court agrees.

In 2001, Utah Code§ 57-1-23 was amended to read: ''The trustee who is qualified under

Subsection 57-1-21(l)(a)(i) or (iv) is given the power of sale;" thus prohibiting the former
practi~e of allowing "any depository institution" to have the power of sale. Utah Code § 57-1-

23.3 Utah law confers the power of sale only to
any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place within the state
where the trustor or other interested parties may meet with the trustee

(i)

and
(iv)

any title insurance comp~y or agency that:
(A) hoids a certificate of authority or license under Title 3IA, Insurance Code, to
conduct insµrance business ~ the state;
(B) is actu~y d9irtg 'business in the state; and
(C) maintains a bona fide office in the state;

Utah Code § 57-1-~l(i) and (iv).
Notably, Section 57-1-21(4) mand~tes that "[a] trµst deed with ail unqu~ified trustee or
without a trustee shall be effective to create a Hen on the trust property, but the power of sale and
other trustee powers under the trust deed may be exercised only if the beneficiary has appointed
a qualified successor~stee under Section 57-1--22." Utah Code§ S7~1-21(4).

2

This Fifth District Court decision is currently on appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals. See Bank ofAmerica v.
Adamson, Appellate Case.No. 2014086i.
.
3
The 2001 version of the statute required active members of the Bar to reside in Utah. Que to legal challenges to
this requirement, the legislature amended the statute two adclitional times, in 2qo2 and 2()04, ultima~~ly en~cting the
language in effect today and at the time of the sale of the Ring property in 2009. See Kleinsmith v. Shurileff, 571
F.3d 1033, 103(>-37 (10th Cir. 2009).
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The Utah Court of Appeals relied upon this statutory language in McQueen v. Jordan

Pines Townhomes Owners Ass'n, Inc. to affirm a trial court's determination that a "nonjudicial
foreclosure proceeding conducted by the Association was ineffective and void because the
Association failed to appoint a qualified trustee to conduct the nonjudicial foreclosure sale."

McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass 'n, Inc., 2013 UT App 53, ,r 7, 298 P.3d 666.
In McQueen, a homeowners' association allowed its attorney to conduct a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale but did not appoint the attorney as a trustee to conduct the sale, instead relying
upon language .in the Condominium Ownership Act that allows the manager or .management
committee to enforce foreclosure. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion
that the sale was ineffective and void because the Trust Deed Act required a qualified trustee be
appointed in order for a µ.onjudicial foreclosure sale to occur, Id., at ,nr 19-21 and 28.
Similar to the homeowners' association in McQueen, here, MERS failed to appoint a
qualified trustee to conduct the nonjudicial foreclosure sale. It is undisputed that ReconTrust
;

was not a qualified successor trustee with a power of sale. MERS failed to appoint a licensed
-~

Otah attorney or title company with an office in the state as successor trustee. As the appointed
successor trustee, ReconTrust had no ability to convey title at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale
because it did not have the power of sale. Therefore, as in McQueen, the sale by ReconTru.st was
ineffective and void ab initio.
Because the sale is void and a nullity, instead of voidable, any requirement to prove
injury and violation of rights due to the alleged defect of sale, as specified in Reynolds v.

Woodall, 2012 UT App 206, 285 P.3d 7 and RM Lifestyles, LLC v. Ellison, 2011 UT App 290,
263 P.3d 1152, is not applicable. Both Reynolds and RM Lifestyles involved the recordation of a
substitution of trustee after a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, and neither involved a challenge to the
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sale because the trustees were not qualified trustees with the power of sale. Thus, the sales in

Reynolds and RM Lifestyles were voidable due to purported procedural defects, as opposed to
void because the trustee lacked the authority or power of sale.
In Banger/er v. Petty, the Utah Court of Appeals applied this reasoning as a basis for
finding a sheriff's sale voidable, and not void: "'[A] void act results where the public officer has
no authority to act at all, whereas a voidable act results from the officer's imperfect execution of
an otherwise lawful act.'" Bangerter v. Petty, 2010 UT App 49, ,r 12,228 P.3d 1250 (quotations

omitted). Thus, because the sheriff had the appropriate authority to conduct the sale even if it
was imperfectly executed, the Banger/er Court concluded that the sale was voidable, not void.
In contrast, in Singer Mfg. Co. v. Chalmers, 2 Utah 542 (1880), the Utah Supreme Court
held that a trust sale was void where it was not performed by the person authorized with the
power of sale under the deed of trust, regardless of whether there was "injury or fraud in the
sale" and regardless of whether "the purchaser was an innocent party:"
The deed of trust authorized the sale to be made by the United States Marshal. This
was not done. One of his deputies made the sale as auctioneer••.The fact that no injury
or fraud in the sale has been shown, does not affect the question. Nor is it affected by
the fact, that the purchaser was an innocent party. The sale was 1I1ade by one not
authorized to make it, and cannot be upheld. It is simply void, and no one gains any
rights under it.

Singer Mfg. Co. v. Chalmers, 2 Utah 542, 546-47 (Utah Terr. 1880).
U.S. Bank/ReconTrust attempt to distinguish Singer on the basis that "the auctioneer who
conducted the sale was not the appointed trustee and was not authorized to act as trustee under
the deed of trust." (See Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Jim Ring's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 6). However, as in Singer, ReconTrust was not authorized to act as
trustee for a sale by the language of the trust deed itself. The Ring Trust Deed provides that the
lender may appoint a successor trustee, who "shall succeed to all the title, power and duties
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conferred upon Trustee herein and by Applicable Law.'' Trust Deed, ,I 24 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Trust Deed itself limited the powers conferred to ReconTrust as those conferred by
applicable law. As an unqualified trustee, ReconTrust could not succeed to the power of sale.
Moreover, regardless of the language of the Trust Deed, ReconTrust could not, and did not,
possess the power of sale and was not authorized to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of this
property. See Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Associates, 795 P. 2d 665,669 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990)(a contract "implicitly contains the laws existing at the time it was entered").
U.S. Bank/ReconTrust also attempt to distinguish McQueen because the person "who
conducted the sale...was not appointed trustee" and never held title, whereas in this case,
Reco~Trust was appointed trustee, but simply did not have the power of sale. This Court finds
this factual distinction to be unpersuasive. The crucial fact present in Singer and McQueen, that
is also present in this case, is the sales were conducted by someone who did not have the

authority to conduct them. Thus, the Court finds it irrelevant whether ReconTrust "held title,"
because ReconTrust indisputably did not have the power to convey that title through a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale.
A.

The Sale is Void and Not a Voidable Ultra Vires Act.

U.S. Bank/ReconTrust argue that as successor trustee, ReconTrust held legal title to the
property, and "if it exceeded its statutory authority by conveying that title, that ultra vires act
would notbe void unless it violated public policy." See Joint Memorandum in Opposition to
. Defendant Jim Ring's Motion for Summary Judgment, p.7. In support of this argwnent, U.S.
Bank/ReconTrust rely primarily upon two cases: Millard Cnty. Sek Dist. v. State Bank of
MillardCnty, 14 P.2d 967 (Utah 1932) and Ockeyv. Lehmer, 2008 UT37, 189 P.3d 51. In
Millard a bank provided notes and mortgages as collateral security to a school district as security
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for public funds deposited by-the district with the bank. Approximately four years later, the bank
sought the return of the securities, alleging they violated certain statutes~ The Utah Supreme

Court held that the bank could not_ repudiate its pledge of the securities after it had benefitted
from and used the school district funds. Id at 973. In so holding, the Utah Supreme Cowtrelied
on case law that held "a national bank cannot repudiate its contract as ultra vires and at the same

time retain the benefits thereof." Id
Similarly, in Ockey, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the attempt by a former beneficiary
of irrevocable trusts to invalidate a conveyance, that he expressly (and in writing) had directed
the trustees of the irrevocable trusts to make, after he had accepted substantial benefits from the

conveyance for several years. Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ,i,r 26-32. According to the terms

of the irrevocable trusts, title to the property would pass to the beneficiary on his 21 st birthday, or
when he turned 28 ifhe elected to extend the trust. Id at 15. He directed the trustees to make
the conveyance at issue approximately eight years after he turned 28. Id at ,r 11. The Ockey
Cowt held that the conveyance was voidable, and not void, because, at best, it only harmed the
former trust beneficiary, and did not violate public policy. Id. at ,1 17-24.
Unlike the circumstances in Millard and Ockey, Ring is not an actor who seeks to
repudiate his own conduct after having accepted substantial benefits resulting from such conduct.

There is no allegation that Ring received any benefits by ReconTrust's illegal performance of the
nonjudicial sale. To the contrary, Ring asserts he was deprived of the benefits intended by the
legislature's restriction on who can conduct nonjudicial foreclosure sales.
As recognized by the Ockey Court, "In general, the difference between void and voidable
contracts is whether they offend public policy. Contracts that offend an individual, such as those

arising from fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake, are voidable. Only contracts that offend public
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\1

j

· ~olicy or harm the public are void ab initio." Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ,r 19, 189 P.3d 51,
56. The Ockey Court pointed to language from Millard explaining: "only 'contracts and
corporate acts and transactions which are malum in se or malum ptohibitum, which contravene
some rule of public policy, [or] violate some public duty ...are illegal and void."' Id at ,r 22
(quoting
Millard, 14 P.2d at 971-72).
,._
1·

Strong public policy supports the requirement that a qualified trustee conduct a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale. In 2001, the legislature substantially narrowed who could conduct
nonjudicial foreclosure sales under Utah law. Under the former version of the statute, the power
of sale was conferred upon any depository institution. By amendments enacted between 20012004, the legislature required that, in order to exercise a power of sale, the trustee must be either
a licensed Utah attorney who maintains a place within the state where a truster could meet with
the trustee, or a title company with an office in the state.

The obvious intention of the

legislature's revisions was to ensure trustees conducting nonjudicial sales were accessible and
present in the state. As the Tenth Circuit recognized in upholding the constitutionality of these
limitations imposed by the Utah legislature: "Making it easier for Utahns to meet with trustees,
who play a pivotal role in nonjudicial foreclosures, is a legitimate state interest." Kleinsmith v.

Shurtleff, 571 F.3d 1033, 1048 (10 th Cir. 2009); see also McQueen, 2013 UT App 53, at ,121
("[t]he purpose of requiring the appointment of a qualified trustee is to provide an independent
third party who can objectively execute a foreclosure or sale in the absence of judicial oversight.
. . . [Thus,] a party must appoint a qualified trustee in order to enforce a

D lien without judicial

int~rvention."
Neither Millard nor Ockey involve~ a nonjudicial foreclosure sale by a person or entity
who did not possess authority to conduct such a sale. Unlike the situation presented by this case,
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the transactions at issue in Millard and Ockey were entered into ·voluntarily and knowingly by
the party who later sought to ~void the transaction, but only after having received substantial
benefits.

This is a dispositive distinction. As the Ockey Court stated, it started with the

presumption that the contract at issue was voidable, and not void, due to the general nile that
"'the law favors the right of men of full age and competent understanding to contract freely.,,,

Id. at ,r 21. No such presumption applies here; because Ring did not ask ReconTrust to conduct
the sale; and Ring did not receive any purported benefits from ReconTrust's conduct.
Allowing unqualified trustees to conduct nonjudicial foreclosure sales contravenes the
public policy advanced by the Trust Deed Act's requirements and violates the duty the trustees
owe to Utahns. Consequently, this Court finds that the sale conducted by ReconTrust who was
unqualified trustee, violates public policy, is illegal and void ab initio. 4 5
Because the Court holds the sale by ReconTrust was illegal and void ab initio based upon
the undisputed facts, it follows that U.S. Bank's unlawful detainer claim fails as a matter of law
because it is not the owner of the Property. Accordingly, U.S. Barik~s motion for summary
judgme,nt on its unlawful detainer claim against Ring pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-6-802 an.d/or
802.S is DENIED, and Ring's motion. for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's unlawful detainer
claim is GRANTED. ·Accordingly, U.S. Bank's unlawful detainer claim is DISMISSED.
U.S. Bank also moved for summary judgment and dismissal as to Ring's counterclaims.
Several of the grounds argued as support for U.S. Bank's motions relied upon the validity of the
4

Because the sale is void, the presumptions afforded to a bona fide purchaser do not apply: "The protections
afforded to bona fide purchasers do not appiy to deeds that are void. Consequently a void deed· cannot convey a
legal intere$t, even against an innocent purchaser or a bona fide encumbrance;r for value." See S.E.C. v. Madison
Real Estate Grp.; LLC, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279 (D. Utah 2009). Thus, Ute Court denies U.S. Bank's Motion to
Dismiss on this ground. See U.S. Bank Memo. in support of Motion to bismis.s i2-14.
5
U.S. B~ and ReconTrust argue that Ring would receive a windfall if the sale ls held to be voicl. See Jom.t Opp.
M~mo. at 5-6~ The Court fails to see how Ring would receive a windfall. If the sale is void, it simply needs to be
redone in a legal manner by a qualified trustee. If the purported windfall is the faytthat Ring has r~mained in
possession of$e,property since 2009, that is a windfall U.S. Bank voluntarily chose to bestow upQn him.by
ailowing him to remain, and not pursuing unlawful detainer until late 2014.

at
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Trustee's Deed
executed by ReconTrust. Because·the Court holds the Trustee's Deed is void it
.
~

also DENIES U.S. Bank's sumrtiary judgment and dismissal motions that rely upon the Trustee's
De~d as a basis for relief Last, to tlie extent ReconTrust's seeks judgment on the pleadings on

th~ basis that the sale is not void, the motion is DENIED.

III.

Ring's.First Cause of Action for Quiet Title Is Not Barred by the Statute of
Limitations, and His .Second and Third Causes of Action
Moot Because the
Sale Is Void. 6

Are

U.S. Banlc moved the Court to grant it summary judgment on Ring's counterclaims
because they are barred by the statute oflimitations. See U.S. Bank's Memo. in support of
Summary Judgment at 5-9. U.S. Bank's motiori asks for judgment because Ring was required to
assert claims that the sale did not comply with the Trust Deed Act requirements within three or at

most four years. Id. _Ring's Second Cause of Action is based upon defective notice of the ·sale
and his Third Cause of Action is based upon inadequate purchase price. Because the Court h~

ruled the sale is void, these two causes of action are moot. As to the First Cause Qf Action for
Quiet Title, the Court of Appeals of Utah has held that "the statute of limitations does not apply
to true quiet title actions." Powder Run at Deer Valley Owner ;J.ss'n v. Black Diamond Lodge at

Deer VaII~yAss'n of Unit Owners, 20!4 UT App 43,320 P.3d 1076. The Utah Supreme Court
has established the general rul~ that where "the action is purely one to remove a cloud or to quiet
title [to real property],. the statute of limitations has not application." Id at 1081 (quoting
Bnintingv. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 P. 995~ 1001 (1915)). The Utah Supreme Court has

further stated:
If the action is a trt,le q'1iet title action, meaning an action merely to "quiet a1i existing title
against an adverse or hostile claim of another," then the statute of limitations will not bar
the claim. However, "[i]f the party's claim for quiet title relief can be granted only if the

6

U.S. Banlc also moved to dismiss Ring's Second and Third Causes of A~tion under Rule 12(b)(6); because the
claims are rendered moot by the Court's determination that the sale is void, the Court does not rea~h these issues.
13
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party succeeds on another claim, then the statute of limitations applicable to the other
·
claim will also apply to the quiet title claim."

Id (quoting In re Hoopiiaina .Trust, 2006 UT 53, ~126-27, 144 P. 3d 1129). Given that Ring's
first cause of action for quiet title is an action for "true quiet title" and does not rely upon the
success of another claim, this action is not barred by any statute of limitations. Thus, U.S.
Bank's motion for summary judgment as .to the First Cause of Action based upon s~tute of
limitations is DENIED.
IV.

Ring;s Fourth Cause of Action Against Recontrust for Violation of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith And Fair Dealing Barred by the Six Year Statute of
Limitations Pursuant io Utah Code §78B-i-307(3).

Is

ReconTrust moves for judgment on the pleadings, arguing in part that Ring's Fourth
Cause of Action is untimely. Ring's Fourth Cause of Action is for breach of the.implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and is subject to a six-year statute of limitation under

{!~ Code §78B-2-309 ("an action may be bro~ght within six years upon...any liability founded
[upon the contract]"). Utah Code §78B-2".'309(2). Ring claims that ReconTrust breached the
implied covenant on the date of the ~stee's sale, and admits that the third-party claim against
ReconTrust was filed six years and one day after the date of the trustee sale; however, Ring
claims that the relation-back doctrine un,der Utah Rule of Civil Procedure I 5(c) saves the claim

by relating it back to the date of the original pleading because "the claim arises [out] of the
trans~ction set forth in the original pleading." See Ring's Opposition to Judgment on the

Pleadings. ReconTrust refutes the application of the relation-back doctrine by citiI\g Penrose v.

Ross which states, "generally•..rule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or.
adds new parties for those brought before the court by the original pleadings." Penrose v. Ross,
2003 UT App 157, 19, 71 P.3d 631,634. Because the relation-back doctrine does not apply
when new parties are added to the amended pleadings, the fourth cause of action is barred by the
14
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statute of limitations; therefore, the claims against ReconTrust are untimely and hereby
DISMISSED.
V.

Ring's First Cause of Action for Quiet Title Does Not Fail to State a Claim.

U.S. Bank argues that Ring has failed to set forth a quiet title claim as a matter oflaw. In
making this assertion, U.S. Bank correctly observes that "[t]o succeed in an action to quiet title
to real estate, a (party] must prevail on the strength of his own claim to title and not on the
weakness of a[n] [opposing party's] title or even its total lack of title." Kelly v. Hard Money

Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, 119, 87 P.3d 734., Nevertheless, ''[a]ll a party need do is prove

prima facie that he has title which, if not overcome by the opposing party, is sufficient" Gillmor
v. Blue Ledge Corp., 2009 UT App 230, 114, 217 P.3d 723. In the 12(b)(6) context, Ring has
sufficiently set forth a quiet title claim-Ring has alleged that he has title to the Property based on
his November 30, 2005 purchase thereof. And because the Court has determined that the

Tn,istee's Deed is void as a matter of law, dismissal is not warranted based upon the deed to U.S.
Bank.
U.S. Bank also argues that Ring's quiet title claim is barred by the doctrine of laches.
"To successfully assert laches, one must establish that (1) [a party] unreasonably delayed in
bringing an action, and (2) [the opposing party] w[as] prejudiced by that delay." Nilson-Newey

& Co. v. Utah Res. Int'/, 905 P.2d 312,314 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added). "The length
of time that constitutes [unreasonable delay] depends on the circumstances of each case; .because
the propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon the gravity of the prejudice suffered
and the length of delay. 11 Veysey v. Veysey, 2014 UT App 264, ,I16, 339 P.3d 131. Under a
12(Q)(6) standard, the Court cannot make the leap proposed by U.S. Bank to dismiss Ring's quiet
title claim~ Consequently, U.S. Bank's Motion to Dismiss isDENIED.
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No further order is necessary to effectuate this ruling.

DATED this 4th day of September, 20 I 5.
DISTRJCT COURT JUDGE

/L--~
Judge Kara Pettit
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